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Circumstances That Would Prejudice
Impartiality: The Meaning of Fairness
in Japanese Jurisprudence
By MARK A. LEVIN *
This article presents a body of published judicial decisions
relating to judicial challenge where the statutory law explicitly
requires judges to weigh the fairness of the justice process in the
particular circumstances of concrete facts in cases before them.
These cases reveal a history where, despite facing the question
in the matters before them, the meaning of fairness has barely
earned any explanation from Japan's judges in their formal
jurisprudential voice.
Although fairness is "entrusted to the judgment of the courts,"'
it seems as if Japan's judges have seen themselves as inherently fair.
Early decisions, in particular, demonstrated a narrow
acknowledgement of the potential for bias and were resolved via a
formalistic reasoning that paid no apparent regard for the public's
perceptions. In short, fairness appeared to be presumed as
ubiquitous in judges' professional capacities. Case closed.
A few years back, I criticized the fairness of Japan's civil justice
* Professor of Law, William S. Richardson School of Law. Funding for this work
was generously supported by the Kashiwagi Endowment at the William S.
Richardson School of Law and in-kind contributions during an extended research
visit at the Hokkaido University School of Law. Much appreciation is owing to
Hokkaido University Graduate School of Law and Politics Professor Ichiro Ozaki,
Aoyama Gakuin Law School Professor Setsuo Miyazawa, Meiji University
Professor Lawrence Repeta, the participants at "Successes, Failures, and Remaining
Issues of the Justice System Reform in Japan" at UC Hastings College of the Law,
and to Ms. Kori Weinberger for her outstanding research assistance. Except where
otherwise indicated, statutory translations are drawn from the Japanese Ministry of
Justice's Japanese Law Translation website, www.Japaneselawtranslation.co.jp, and
all other translations are the author's.
1. Tokyo Kat6 Saibansho [Thky6 High Ct.] May 8, 1970, Sh6 45 (u) no. 283, 590
HANJI 18. See infra note 65 and accompanying text.
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system owing to a set of dynamics in the operation of the courts
which I labeled instrumental judicial administration. Granted, fairness
is just one value in potential competition with other values;
individuals can surely differ in how to prioritize it. Moreover, there
are diverse notions of the meaning of fairness itself. Nonetheless,
my critique then intentionally glossed over these differences by
drawing primarily from my normative judgment of a properly
functioning, i.e. fair, civil justice system.
In that writing, Civil Justice and the Constitution,2 although I
did not imagine that my normative judgment represented any
universal truth, I nonetheless aimed to establish that my views were
shared with insider academics and participants in Japan's legal
system.3 To better situate my views into Japan's domestic setting, I
introduced the language in the Japanese constitution and legislation
enacted by the Japanese parliament that might be considered most
analogous to the U.S. Constitution's due process clauseS4 and I
briefly noted the treatment of this issue by Japan's courts. Still, all of
these presentations begged the question as to whose understanding
of fairness should frame the discussion.
Hoping now to pull away from my views as the basis for
judgment on the meaning of fairness, this article aims to explore
how fairness is formally expressed within Japanese legal discourse.
After a brief recapitulation of the constitutional and legislative
2. Mark A. Levin, Civil Justice and the Constitution: Limits on Instrumental
Judicial Administration in Japan, 20 PAC. RIM L. & POL'Y J. 265 (2011). Instrumental
Judicial Administration is defined as "mechanisms or actions employed by judicial
administrators to intentionally bias adjudicatory processes in favor of a particular
party or result despite lacking authority as to the disposition of the subject case or
class of cases." Id. at 267. Moreover, as my criticism was limited to a discrete set of
cases and circumstances, I made my view clear there that the broader context is of
an admirably functioning judicial system with outstandingly competent and
trustworthy judges. Id. at 268. I emphatically repeat the same view here.
3. "Insider" is used here to reference Japanese scholars and participants within
the modem nation of Japan as a whole, in contrast to "indigenous" referencing
Japan's indigenous people or peoples. See, e.g., Mark A. Levin, Essential
Commodities and Racial Justice: Using Constitutional Protection of Japan's Indigenous
Ainu People to Inform Understandings of the United States and Japan, 33 N.Y.U. J. INT'L
L. & POL. 419 (2001).
4. U.S. CONsT. amends. V & XIV. These notions are not directly analogous to
due process in the U.S. constitutional setting, but merely its closest counterparts.
Due process in the U.S. has a long history that carries very heavy freight in a way
that is hardly matched in Japan's much newer constitutional setting. (Thanks to
Meiji University Faculty of Law Professor Lawrence Repeta for the apt phrasing
used here.)
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setting,5 this article aims to present how Japanese judges have
themselves articulated the meaning of fairness in their resolution of
concrete disputes.
This article should launch as many questions as it will settle. To
be clear, the article does not directly ask or answer whether the
process was fair in those or similar cases. It is at least plausible to
believe that the courts have been consistently, or at least sufficiently,
sage in their determinations, so that armchair quarterback criticism
is unwarranted. Moreover, this article looks at a historical record in
a particular setting and leaves open the question of whether the past
adequately describes the current state of affairs or predicts the
future.
In that last regard, this article concludes with the
contemplations called for by the organizers of this symposium issue:
"Successes, Failures, and Remaining Issues of the Justice System
Reform in Japan." In my opinion, the record of judicial challenge
cases shows a set of questionable determinations in the early post-
war years in Japan. More recent decisions emerging in the context
of the massive changes to Japan's justice system launched by the
Justice System Reform Council's groundbreaking 2001 Report
suggest that judicial system reform has had a positive impact with
regards to the quality of fairness in Japanese civil justice.6 An April
2011 decision by the Japanese Supreme Court's 2nd Petty Bench,
which clearly denotes a requirement of due process in civil
procedure, will be discussed to justify optimism for further
improvement in the years ahead.
I. Context: Terms Regarding Procedural Fairness in Japanese
Constitutional and Statutory Texts
Procedural fairness, what Americans might call "due process," 7
is explicitly incorporated into central Japanese legal texts, including
the nation's Constitution, its Code of Civil Procedure, and various
5. The constitutional and legislative framing of civil procedural fairness were
amply presented in Civil Justice and the Constitution. Levin, supra note 2, Part III.
6. Justice System Reform Council, Recommendations of the Justice System Reform
Council: For a Justice System to Support Japan in the 21st Century - June 12, 2001 (Daniel
Foote trans.) [hereinafter JSRC Report] available at http://www.kantei.go.jp/
foreign/judiciary/2001/0612report.html.
7. As discussed supra note 4, the historic and judicially acknowledged
significance of the U.S. notion of due process sets it entirely apart from its Japanese
counterpart language.
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treaties. Given that Japanese judges are obligated to accept these
texts as binding sources of law, these provisions are surely an
essential background setting for cases concerning fairness,
regardless of whether the sources are explicitly addressed in their
decisions. These provisions may also be seen as contextual hooks
for expecting fairness in Japanese civil justice.
Explained in greater detail in my earlier article, these texts are
only briefly introduced here. Moreover, I will give away the punch
line in advance: although scholarly understandings plainly situate
these provisions into discussions concerning civil due process and
fairness, these textual provisions have generated virtually nothing
by way of judicial pronouncements in judicial decisions.8 We will
remain hungry in our search for guidance as to the meaning of
fairness in Japanese jurisprudence that might be revealed through
these sources.
A. Constitutional and Treaty Language
Article 32 of the Japanese Constitution appears to declare for all
people in Japan a right to obtain justice in the courts.9 Interestingly,
the historical record suggests that the U.S.-led Allied Occupation
and Japanese constitutional drafters were aiming to address due
8. As a member of the civil law tradition in legal systems, the prevailing
notion of law in Japan incorporates only the Constitution and enacted laws and
regulations. Judicial decisions in the civil law tradition serve as essential source for
understanding the meaning of enacted law, but formally speaking, these are not
law per se. For this reason, this article references synonymously judicial decisions
and jurisprudence, and explicitly avoids the term "case law" with regards to Japan.
See JOHN HENRY MERRYMAN, THE CIVIL LAW TRADITION 23 (3d ed. 2007) (judicial
decisions are not law in the civil law tradition), but see J. Mark Ramseyer, Mixing-
and-Matching Across (Legal) Family Lines, 6 BYU L. REV. 1701 (2009) (presenting
Japan as a mix of multiple legal traditions).
9. NIHONKOKU KENPO [KENPO] [CONSTITUTION], art. 32 (Japan). It is important
to note that the English phrasing for Article 32 given here as a "right to obtain
justice in the courts" is idiosyncratic. The official Japanese, #IAfJ t, 9491J9):-480
T ~ glJ .f +tfIg]i t ', has no official translation. A standardized
translation is the English version born in the original 1946 drafts exchanged
between U.S. occupation officials and Japanese negotiators: "No person shall be
denied the right of access to the courts." It can be argued that this narrower
reading accurately reflects Japanese constitutional jurisprudence, as is presented in
Saik6 Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Sept. 29, 1970, Sh6 45 (ku) no. 191, 100 SAIKO SAIBANSHO
MINJI HANREISHO [MINSHO] 499, discussed infra note 64. On the other hand, this
inadequately conveys the richer interpretation of Article 32 that is persistently
articulated by Japan's leading constitutional law scholars. See Levin, supra note 2,
at 290, 295-99.
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process only in criminal matters.10 Nonetheless, the meaning of
Article 32 has since morphed into a broader construction that
includes both civil and criminal justice."
Other constitutional provisions support Article 32's
prescription for a right to obtain justice. These include Article 14's
declaration for equality under law, Article 76 (3)'s command for
judicial independence, and Article 82's requirement for open trials
in the courts.12
Treaty language to which Japan has committed itself similarly
addresses fairness in judicial proceedings as a fundamental human
right. Article 10 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
provides "Everyone is entitled in full equality to a fair and public
hearing by an independent and impartial tribunal, in the
determination of his rights and obligations and of any criminal
charge against him."13 The International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights elucidates upon the UDHR's aspiration text through
its Articles 14 and 26.14
However, Article 32, its constitutional kin provisions, and the
UDHR and ICCPR treaty language have generated scant
consideration in Japanese judicial decisions.' 5 They are of little help
in a search for the meaning of fairness expressed in Japanese
jurisprudence.
B. An Aspiration for Fairness: Code of Civil Procedure Article 2
Although procedural fairness was arguably implied in the
above constitutional and treaty texts, the concept did not earn
10. Levin, supra note 2, at 291-93.
11. Id. at 293-99.
12. Id. at 299-301.
13. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, at 71, U.N. GAOR
3d. Sess., 1st plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/810, (Dec. 10, 1948) [hereinafter UDHR] art.
10.
14. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI),
21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966), 999 U.N.T.S. 171
entered into force March 23, 1976 [hereinafter ICCPR] arts. 14(1) ("All persons shall
be equal before the courts and tribunals") and 26 ("All persons are equal before the
law and are entitled without any discrimination to the equal protection of the
law.")
15. Levin, supra note 2, at 296-99 (paucity of judicial precedent concerning
Article 32) and 299-302 (ditto re. other constitutional and treaty provisions). In
contrast, due process in civil litigation is a central element of U.S. constitutional
jurisprudence. See, e.g.,Caperton v. A. T. Massey Coal Co., Inc., 556 U.S. 868 (2009).
4792013]
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explicit reference in civil procedure law enacted in Japan until just
recently. In the context of a major overhaul of the entire Code of
Civil Procedure, modernization included the addition of a new
Article 2 with an expressed aspiration for fairness in 1996.16
Civil procedure law in Japan is codified in a unitary statute, the
Code of Civil Procedure, applicable to virtually all civil suits
nationwide. First enacted in 1890, Japan's Code of Civil Procedure
was based primarily upon the corresponding German text of the
time.'7 Fairness may have been understood as essential to a
properly functioning civil justice system, but this understanding
was unstated for over one-hundred years.
In the 1996 revision, fairness was incorporated into a new
Article 2 which reads: "Courts shall endeavor to ensure that civil suits
are carried out fairly and expeditiously and parties shall conduct civil suits
in good faith."18
However, as I have previously noted, "there is less here than
might meet the eye."19 First, one observes that a court's task is
merely to endeavor towards the goals of fairness and
expeditiousness, in contrast to parties' obligation to carry out
litigation in good faith. Second, even this aspiration for fairness in
Article 2 rests in a confusing balance with an equally compelling call
for expeditiousness. There is no advice as to how judges ought to
address circumstances where these two vital goals might conflict.20
C. Case Decisions Regarding These Textual Sources
1. The Vacuum Surrounding Constitutional and Treaty Sources
Constitutional and treaty sources have generated essentially no
relevant discussion in judicial decisions with regards to the meaning
of fairness in Japanese civil justice. Thus, for example, one finds
16. MINJI SOSHOHO [MINSOHO] (C. Civ. PRO.) 1996, art. 2. The Japanese is iLiE,
k6sei, which Kenkyusha translates as: "justice; fairness; rectitude; equity;
impartiality." KENKYOSHA SHIN WA-El DAIJITEN (KENKYUSHA'S NEW JAPANESE-
ENGLISH DICTIONARY) 937 (4th ed. 1974).
17. TAKAAKI HATrORI & DAN FENNO HENDERSON, CIVIL PROCEDURE IN JAPAN
§1.03[1] (1985).
18. MINSOHO (C. Civ. PRO.), art. 2 (emphasis added). In Japanese:
19. Levin, supra note 2, at 302.
20. Id. at 302-03.
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nothing meaningful in decisions cited in this regard in a leading
compendium of statutes, the modem Roppo Zensho, in conjunction
with Article 32, the other constitutional provisions noted, or the
treaty sources. 21 Similarly, review of a leading constitutional law
treatise cites only to a criminal law decision in its discussion of
fairness implied in the Constitution's Article 32.22 Accordingly,
these provisions represent a virtually dead-end path in searching for
the meaning of fairness in Japanese jurisprudence. 23
2. CCP Article 2 Gets a Nod: Supreme Court of Japan 2nd Petty
Bench, April 13, 2011
The Code of Civil Procedure's Article 2's statutory
contemplation of fairness also presented an essentially empty set of
Japanese jurisprudence for its first fifteen years.24 However, these
21. For example, Article 32 gains bare mention in a 1970 decision by the
Supreme Court's 1st Petty Bench. On appeal from the Tokyo High Court decision
discussed infra Part II.B.4, the Court refused to acknowledge that constitutional
rights might be implicated in a judicial challenge petition: "the point of Article 32 is
that all citizens have a right to receive adjudication in a court established pursuant
to the laws and the Constitution, and are guaranteed not to not to be subject to
adjudication in any other institution but the courts." Saik6 Saibansho [Sup. Ct.]
Sept. 29, 1970, Sh6 45 (ku) no. 191, 100 SAIKO SAIBANSHO MINJI HANREISHO [MINSHO]
499.
22. NOBUYOSHI ASHIBE, KENPO [CONSTITUTIONAL LAw] 224 (1999); Professor
Matsui similarly presents no judicial decisions concerning Article 32 and frames it
primarily as a protection in the criminal law context in his English language treatise
on the Japanese Constitution. SHIGENORI MATSUI, THE CONSTITUTION OF JAPAN: A
CONTEXTUAL ANALYSIS 121, 158 (2011).
23. See also Levin, supra note 2, at 296-99 (paucity of judicial precedent
concerning Article 32) and 299-302 (ditto re. other constitutional and treaty
provisions). While a 2008 decision by the 3rd Petty Bench of the Supreme Court
deftly avoided consideration of Article 32, there was some attention to its "spirit" in
the concurrence by Justice Tahara and a dissent by Justice Nasu. Saik6 Saibansho
[Sup. Ct.] May 8, 2008, Hei 19 (ku) no. 1128, 60 MINSHO No .8 51, 1459 SAIBANSHO
JIHO 1, 2011 HANJI 116, 1273 HANTA 125. Drawing on precedents in analogous cases,
the Court had upheld a failure to give notice of appeal from family court
proceedings as being without connection to Article 32 owing to the non-contentious
setting of the applicable family court processes. Justice Tahara expressed strong
sentiments regarding Article 32's import for procedural due process, but concurred
in the result. Justice Nasu would have extended Article 32's coverage to
proceedings which are functionally contentious, even if based upon procedures
formally established by law to be noncontentious. Id.
24. Levin, supra note 2, at 303. The provision did garner a minor mention in a
2001 Tokyo District Court decision, but this was in rejecting a litigant's claims by
casting the provision as an indication that fair civil process is an important judicial
capacity which ought not be used abusively. Thky6 Chih6 Saibansho, Mar. 27, 2001,
Hei 10 (wa) no. 3488, 1777 HANJI 80,1071 HANTA 248.
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circumstances changed significantly on April 13, 2011, in a decision
of the 2nd Petty Bench of Japan's Supreme Court.25 The Court's
reversal of a Tokyo High Court decision based upon proceedings
carried out without notice to the losing side was acknowledged to
be "clearly contrary to the requirements of procedural justice in civil
procedure." 26 Although the ruling did not share detail into the
justices' rationale, CCP Article 2 (though not the Constitution's
Article 32 or any other constitutional provisions) is listed in the
Court's references to authority. 27  Thus, Article 2's call for
procedural fairness should be understood as the controlling law
here.
This case represents an important development in the Japanese
jurisprudence, but there are major limitations to the insights that can
be drawn from the ruling. As a recent change in the landscape, this
case will get further explanation and attention in the concluding
section of this article. 28
II. Judicial Disqualification and Challenge Cases as a
Window for Insight into the Meaning of Fairness
Despite the limitations of the sources described above, one area
of the law compels Japanese judges to confront and demonstrate their
understanding of fairness in civil litigation: petitions for judicial
disqualification and challenge under Articles 23 and 24 of the Code
of Civil Procedure. 29 More particularly, the statutory standard of
Article 24 calls upon judges to assess whether "circumstances with
regard to a judge that would prejudice the impartiality of a judicial
decision"30 warrants granting a petition for judicial challenge.3'
25. Saik6 Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Apr. 13, 2011, Hei 22 (ku) no. 1088, 65 MINSHO
No. 3, 1530 SAIBANSHO JIHO 1, 2119 HANTA 32, 1353 HANTA 155, 1945 KIN'YO HOMU
107. A translation is available at http://www.courts.go.jp/english/judgments/
text/2011. 04.13-2010v.-Ku-.No..1088.html.
26. Here again, I am aiming to provide English language readers with a
translation that can be naturally understood in closest approximation to the original
meaning for Japanese readers, notwithstanding what might be available from the
Japanese government's unofficial translations. The variation here is explained infra
note 134.
27. Id. (References section).
28. See discussion infra Part III.A.
29. MINSOHO (C. CIv. PRO.) arts. 23-24. In numeration prior to 1996, these were
Articles 35 - 37. For reading clarity, article numbers 23 and 24 are used throughout,
but I have inserted brackets where the numbers were originally 35-37.
30. MINSOHO (C. CIV. PRO.) art. 24 (
482 [Vol. 36:2
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Thus, these cases essentially call for determinations of what is or is
not fair under the particular circumstances of concrete cases.
Accordingly, these cases provide a perfect window for insight into
Japanese judicial understanding of fairness.
Fortunately, this body of jurisprudence is compact.32 My
research has uncovered ten published case decisions under the
current Constitution and Code of Civil Procedure that address the
substantive standards here. 33 Five are reported from the Supreme
Court, three from High Courts, and two from District Courts. Of
these, one finds seven varieties of fact scenarios for contested
disqualification or challenge. 34
In all but one of these recorded decisions, the results were
denials of the petitions and refusals by the court to remove the
31. A better translation would use "fairness" instead of "impartiality" for 6lE.
"Fairness" is more common, less jargoned, and consistent with the Ministry of
Justice's official translation of Article 2. See supra note 16 (Kenkyusha's translation:
"justice; fairness; rectitude; equity; impartiality.") Moreover, the drafters of the
Code opted not to use an alternative word choice Ail' / kahei, which much more
directly connotes "impartiality" (as in equality of treatment) in comparison to the
notions of correctitude (from E) explicit in 6 kE. TSUKAIKATA NO WAKARU
RUIGOKEIKAI JITEN (EASY TO UNDERSTAND DICTIONARY OF USAGE) (Shogakukan 2003,
electronic edition) A!kT'I.
32. This contrasts with the United States. The table of cases in a 2007 treatise on
judicial disqualification in the United States lists approximately 4,500 cases.
RICHARD E. FLAMM, JUDICIAL DISQUALIFICATION: RECUSAL AND DISQUALIFICATION OF
JUDGES (2d ed. 2007). Admittedly, if one divides 4,500 by 51 (the number of U.S.
states and federal systems), the ratio is only nine-to-one. Nonetheless, the numbers
suggest differing treatments in the two nations.
33. An initial search was carried out using the case notes provided under
Articles 23 and 24 in a leading annotated Roppa Zensho edition. Further research
was carried out using the Dai-ichi Haki H6 J6h6 S6g6 Database service by searching
for all cases listing either of the two provisions under the "Laws Cited" (VORMI4')
metadata element. Cases which pertained only to the process of petitioning and
those addressing abusive and incessant judicial challenges were then excluded.
34. Academic attention to judicial disqualification is also disparate between the
U.S. and Japan. In contrast with 1,200 pages of text in FLAMM, supra note 32, see also
JAMES J. ALFINI ET AL., JUDICIAL CONDUCT AND ETHICS (4th ed. 2007) ch. 4
(disqualification), ARTHUR GARWIN ET AL., ANNOTATED MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL
CONDUCT (2d ed. 2011) canons 2 and 3, searching the Hokkaid6 and T6kyo
University Law Libraries online catalogs found no monographs on judicial
disqualification or judicial ethics more generally. The most expansive scholarly
treatment on the subject in Japan appears to be Noriko Hatano, Saibankan kihi seid6
saika: sosh5 tajisha no kanten ni yoru tetsuzuki teki k6sei (A Reconsideration of the
Judicial Disqualification System: Procedural fairness from the litigants' perspective), 19
SAPPORO GAKUIN HOGAKU No. 1 1 (2002). Brief treatments of the subject appear m
any number of journals and leading treatises on Japanese Civil Procedure.
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judge. After a brief review of the statutory provisions, this section
introduces all of the published cases, running in rough
chronological order from the earliest decision in 1953 through the
latest in 2002.
A. CCP Articles 23 and 24 in statutory text
Japan's civil procedure system includes two statutory
provisions giving substantive standards for judicial challenge, and a
third provision, in the civil procedural rules, for a judge's self-
initiated recusal. These are Article 23 - standards for
disqualification (I)J, jyoseki), Article 24 - judicial challenge (
kihi), and Rules of Civil Procedure Article 12 - recusal (Rig, kaihi).35
Each is presented, in substantial part, below:
CCP Art. 23: Disqualification of Judge (*#)
(1) In the following cases, a judge shall be disqualified from performing
his/her duties...
(i) Where a judge or his/her spouse or person who was his/her
spouse is a party to the case, or is related to a party in the
case as a joint obligee, joint obligor or obligor for
redemption.
(ii) Where a judge is or was a party's relative by blood within
the fourth degree, relative through marriage within the
third degree or relative living together.
35. Articles 25 and 26 provide for the judicial process in addressing
disqualification and challenge petitions.
Article 25: (1) A judicial decision of the disqualification of or a challenge to
a judge who is a member of a panel or a single judge of a district court
shall be made by an order of the court to which the judge belongs, and ajudicial decision of the disqualification of or a challenge to a judge of a
summary court shall be made by an order of the district court that hasjurisdiction over the location of the summary court.(2) In a district court, the judicial decision set forth in the preceding
paragraph shall be made by a panel.
(3) A judge may not participate in making a judicial decision on the
disqualification of or a challenge to him/herself.
(4) No appeal may be entered against an order finding that the
disqualification or challenge is well-grounded.
(5) An immediate appeal may be filed against an order finding that the
disqualification or challenge is groundless.
Article 26: When a petition for disqualification or challenge is filed, court
proceedings shall be stayed until an order on the petition becomes final
and binding; provided, however, that this shall not apply to any urgent act.
MINSOHO (C. Civ. PRo.) arts. 25 & 26.
484 [Vol. 36:2
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(iii) Where a judge is, in relation to a party, a guardian,
supervisor of a guardian, curator, supervisor of a curator,
assistant or a supervisor of an assistant.
(iv) Where a judge has served as a witness or expert witness in
the case.
(v) Where a judge is or was a party's agent or assistant in
court in the case.
(vi) Where a judge has participated in making an arbitral
award in the case or participated in making a judicial
decision in the prior instance against which an appeal is
entered.
(2) If any of the grounds for disqualification prescribed in the preceding
paragraph exist, the court, upon petition or by its own authority,
shall make a judicial decision of disqualification.36
CCP Article 24: Challenge to Judge (,0i
(1) If there are circumstances with regard to a judge that would
prejudice the impartiality of a judicial decision a party may
challenge such judge.
(2) A party, if he/she, in the presence of a judge, has presented oral
arguments or made statements in preparatory proceedings, may not
challenge the judge; provided, however, that this shall not apply
where the party did not know of the existence of any grounds for
challenge or where any grounds for challenge occurred thereafter. 37
Rules of Civil Procedure, Art. 12: Withdrawal of Judge ()W&
A judge may, in the cases prescribed in paragraph (1) of Article 23
(Disqualification of Judge) or paragraph (1) of Article 24 (Challenge to
Judge) of the Code, withdraw by obtaining the permission of the court
that has the power of supervision.38
These provisions are not new inclusions in Japanese law. At
least as to Articles 23 and 24, their substantive terms have been
36. MINSOHO (C. CIV. PRo.) art. 23.
37. Emphasis added. MINSOHO (C. Civ. PRo.) art. 24. But see supra note 31
(suggesting "fairness" as a better English translation than "impartiality.")
38. Minji sosh6 kitei, [Rules of Civil Procedure], Sup. Ct. Rule No. 5 of 1996, art.
12. An English translation is available at http://www.japaneselawtranslation.
o.jp/law/detail/?id=1846&vm=04&re=02&new=1. In Japanese: 'QJOM :
4852013]
Hastings Int'l & Comp. L. Rev.
essentially unchanged for over one hundred years.39
Moreover, the terms here should not be surprising to observers
from the U.S. legal world. The provisions are generally comparable
to statutory provisions in a sample of three states and federal law in
U.S. civil procedure,40 except that these U.S. codes of judicial
conduct go further by adding into consideration the appearance of
prejudice.41
B. Cases
Seven fact scenarios have been addressed by Japanese courts in
published judicial decisions. All of the cases are first presented in a
summary digest, roughly chronological by court, followed by an
overview discussion.
39. The original 1890 provisions, numbered as Articles 35-37, were written in
the more archaic language of Meiji period Japanese legislation. Apart from
renumbering, modernization of the writing style, and the merging of articles 35 and
36 to two paragraphs of a single Article 24 in 1996, the substantive language of
these provisions is entirely unchanged. The back history of Rules of Civil
Procedure Article 12 was not available for this writing.
40. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C.S. §144 (Matthew Bender & Co., through P.L. No. 112-263
(excluding P.L. 112-239)), HAw. REV. STAT. ANN. §601-7 (LexisNexis 2012), N.Y. JUD.
CT. Acrs §14 (Consol. 2012), WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §4.12.040 (LexisNexis 2012).
There are nonetheless minor variations. Like Japan's CCP Article 23, Hawai'i and
New York specify circumstances for disqualification. U.S. federal law and
Washington's provision are entirely unspecific, akin to CCP Article 24. For
example, in Washington, judges are barred when it is established that "said judge is
prejudiced against any party or attorney, or the interest of any party or attorney
appearing in such cause." Id. As well, Hawai'i and Washington explicitly consider
the possibility of a prejudicial nexis to legal counsel in the litigation, but U.S.
federal law and New York, like Japan, do not.
41. U.S. Canons 2 and 3; Hawai'i Canon 2.11, Washington Canon 2.11, New
York Canon 100(E). See generally Leslie W. Abramson, Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial
Conduct, 79 MARQ. L. REV. 949 (1996); ALFINI ET AL., supra note 34, GARWIN ET AL.,
supra note 34. Japan's Court Act addresses judicial conduct only as to prohibiting
judges' political and commercial activities and the secrecy of deliberations; there is
no counterpart to the U.S. codes of judicial conduct. Saibansho h6 [Court Act], Law
No. 59 of 1947, arts. 52 (Prohibition of Political Activities, etc.) and 75 (Secrecy of
Deliberation).
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1. Art. [23]: Disqualification pursuant to having "participated
in the prior level of the case" requires that the judge had a
formal role in the final decision at the prior level.
Supreme Court of Japan, 1953;42 accord, 1964.43
Facts: Judge A had presided over much of the proceedings in
the original trial in Sapporo District Court, Otaru Branch, but was
promoted and transferred to the Sapporo High Court prior to the
conclusion of the trial proceedings.44 Although Judge A's
investigative dossiers were referenced in the factual findings
ultimately handed down with the first trial verdict,45 Judge A was
not a signatory on that ruling.
Judge A was then assigned to hear the case as a member of
panel hearing the case on appeal to the Sapporo High Court.46
Held: Appeal to Japan's Supreme Court dismissed.
Rationale: Although Judge A had been involved in the original
trial, this did not constitute having "participated in the prior level of
the case" within the contemplation of CCP Article [23] because he
was not a signatory on the final ruling.47
Accord: In a 1964 decision by the Supreme Court of Japan's 3rd
Petty Bench, the court provided a modicum of clarification. Facing
similar facts as had occurred in the 1954 decision,48 the Court
42. Saik6 Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] June 26, 1953, Sh6 26 (o) no. 759, 7 MINSHO No. 6
783, 9 SAIBANSHO MINJl 565.
43. Saik6 Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Oct. 13, 1964, Sh6 39 (gyo-tsu) no. 28, 18 MINSHO
No. 8 1619, 394 HANJI 64, 169 HANTA 131.
44. Japanese judges are routinely transferred over the course of their careers,
mostly commonly spending three years at any particular post. John 0. Haley, The
Japanese Judiciary: Maintaining Integrity, Autonomy, and the Public Trust, in LAW IN
JAPAN: A TURNING POINT 104 (Daniel H. Foote ed. 2007); J. MARK RAMSEYER & ERIC B.
RASMUSEN, MEASURING JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF JUDGING
IN JAPAN 10 (2003) (two to three years).
45. This is not reported in the published decision, but appears in Professor
Michio Makoshi's commentary regarding the case. Michio Makoshi, Zenshin Ni
Kanyo Shita Saibankan No Jyoseki (Judicial Challenge pertaining to a Judge's Participation
in Prior Proceedings of the Case), 76 BESSATSU JURISTO (MINJI SOSHOHO HANREI
HYAKUSEN DAI 2 BAN) [100 SELECT CASES IN CIVIL PROCEDURE] 36 (2d ed. 1982).
46. One can only wonder whether judicial administrators realized (and simply
ignored) the potential conflict in appointing Judge A to this case after his
appointment to the Sapporo High Court.
47. Saik6 Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] June 26, 1953, Sh6 26 (o) no. 759, 7 MINSHO No. 6
783, 9 SAIBANSHO MINJI 565.
48. See supra note 46 (questioning how the same judge came to be appointed at
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explained that CCP Article [23]'s "'participated in the case' means
formal participation in the exercise of the national will that is the trial, i.e.,
deciding the verdict or preparing the judgment decision."49
2. Art. [2314241: Familial relation to one party's legal counsel
(presiding judge was the son-in-law of prevailing party's
counsel) neither disqualifies a judge under Article [231 nor
gives ground for challenge under Article [24].
Supreme Court of Japan, 1955.50
Facts: Judge A presided over the proceedings of a three-judge
panel at the Tokyo High Court, which ruled in favor of party B.
Counsel for the losing party learned subsequently that Judge A was
the son-in-law of his opposing counsel and appealed to the Supreme
Court of Japan on the grounds that the High Court decision had
been illegally decided owing to the participation of a judge who
lacked lawful authority to have participated owing to Articles [23]
and [24].51
Held: Appeal to Japan's Supreme Court dismissed.
Rationale: In what must be described as genuinely minimalist,
the following declaration was the entirety of the Court's elucidation
of its rationale:
Appellant's argument on point number five is without reason
because the fact that the judge who was the presiding judge in the
trial court was the son-in-law of the lawyer for the appellee
partnership is not among the provisions of Code of Civil
Procedure Article [23] and furthermore we cannot say that there
are circumstances regarding the judge which would directly
(I t- , tadachi ni) implicate the terms of Article [24] by impairing
both judicial levels).
49. Saikd Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Oct. 13, 1964, Sh6 39 (gyo-tsu) no. 28, 18 MINSHO
No. 8 1619, 394 HANJI 64, 169 HANTA 131 (emphasis added).
50. Saik6 Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Jan. 28, 1955, Sh6 28 (o) no. 277, 9 MINSHO No. 183.
51. This is a mandatory appeal for the Supreme Court to resolve. "J6koku-
appeal shall always be deemed to have the ground therefor in the following cases: .
. . (2) In case a judge who shall not participate in a judgment by virtue of the law
has participated in the judgment." MINsOHO (C. Civ. PRO.) art. 395 (Law No. 29 of
1890) (EHS Law Bulletin Series trans. 1992). The provision remained essentially
unchanged in the code following the1996 revision. MINSOHO (C. Civ. PRO.) art. 312(2) (1996).
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the fairness of the trial." 52
3. Art. [24]: Participation in judicial rulemaking that is the
subject of the instant litigation does not create grounds for
judicial challenge.
Supreme Court of Japan, 1991.53
Facts: Plaintiffs, seeking the revocation of judicial rules
promulgated by Japan's Supreme Court that had ordered the
closing of the District Court and Family Court branch offices in
Amagi City, challenged the- ability of the justices who had served on
the Judicial Assembly that had originally approved the rules to then
decide the validity of the same under CCP Article [24].54
Held: Appeal to Japan's Supreme Court dismissed.
Rationale: In light of the fact that judicial rulemaking is
formally carried out by the Judicial Assembly, a body constituted by
all of the judges or justices assigned a particular court,55 it was
inevitable that the Justices of the Supreme Court would have been
participants in the Supreme Court's rulemaking. At the same time,
the Court is constitutionally assigned to be the final arbiter of all
justiciable disputes in the nation. Accordingly, there were no
"circumstances that would prejudice impartiality" since the justices
were carrying out their intended roles pursuant to the Constitution
and the Court Act (which establishes the Supreme Court's Judicial
52. Saik6 Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Jan. 28, 1955, Sh6 28 (o) no. 277, 9 MINSHO No. 1
83, point 2. Arguably, this holding adds a wrinkle to the statutory interpretation.
The adverbial V , / tadachi ni, translated here as "directly," inserts a notion of
narrowness into the judicial scrutiny of complaints; this is not explicitly provided
for in the statutory text of Article [24]. Kenkyusha translates tadachi ni with words
including "at once, immediately, directly, [and] forthwith." KENKYOSHA SHIN WA-El
DAIJITEN (KENKYUSHA'S NEW JAPANESE-ENGLISH DICTIONARY) 1696 (4th ed. 1974).
53. Saik6 Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Feb. 2, 1991, Hei 2 (gyo-ni) no. 42, 45 MINsHO No.
2 117, 1045 SAIBANSHO JIHO 1, 1382 HANJI 15, 755 HANTA 93, 874 KINYC HANREI 20.
54. Only three of the five justices on the challenged petty bench had been
involved in the rulemaking; two were newer appointments who had come onto the
bench after the rules were enacted. Id.
55. See, e.g. Saibanshoh6 [Court Act], Law No. 59 of 1947, art. 12 ("(1) The
Supreme Court shall execute judicial administration affairs through deliberations of
the Judicial Assembly and under the general supervision of the Chief Justice of the
Supreme Court; (2) The Judicial Assembly shall consist of all Justices, and the Chief
Justice of the Supreme Court shall be the chairperson."); but see id. art. 13 ("The
Supreme Court shall have a General Secretariat, which shall handle administrative
of the Supreme Court."). See generally Levin, supra note 2, at 276 n.56 & 308-09
n.190.
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Assembly).
Given that the Supreme Court intrinsically (4*A, honrai) will
enact Supreme Court rules and at the same time, our current
judicial system intends for the Court to be addressing litigation
concerning those rules that properly arises on appeal, it is
appropriate to understand that there can be no petition for
challenge based upon Code of Civil Procedure Article [24] with
regards to a justice of the Supreme Court who participated in a
Judicial Conference owing to their having participated in that
Judicial Conference where the rule in question was enacted.56
4. Art. [241: Alleged bias expressed in public statements,
reflecting a general opinion but not an opinion about the
pending matter, does not present circumstances which
would prejudice impartiality under Article [24]. Parties'
involvement with pending impeachment proceedings
pertaining to other litigation against a judge similarly do
not present such circumstances nor grounds for Article [23]
disqualification and Article [24) challenge.
Tokyo High Court, 1970.57
Facts: In labor-related social justice litigation,58 petitioners filed
a judicial challenge petition pursuant to CCP Articles [23] and [24]
raising several grounds:
1) that Judge A, 59 having previously expressed antagonistic
56. Saik6 Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Feb. 2, 1991, Hei 2 (gyo-ni) no. 42, 45 MINsHO No.
2 117, 1045 SAIBANSHO JIHO 1, 1382 HANJI 15, 755 HANTA 93, 874 KINYO HANREI 20.
57. Tokyo Kata Saibansho [T6ky6 High Ct.] May 8, 1970, Sho 45 (u) no. 283, 590
HANJI 18, affid, SAIKO SAIBANSHO [Sup. Ct.] Sept. 29, 1970, She 45 (ku) no. 191, 100
SAIKO SAIBANSHO MINJI HANREISHO [MINSH0] 499.
58. The underlying social justice aspect of the litigation is apparent from the
fact that the case, on appeal to the Supreme Court, included 34 co-counsel
supporting the lead attorney on the pleadings. Saik6 Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Sept. 29,
1970, Sh6 45 (ku) no. 191, 100 MINSHO 499.
59. Judge A was Tokyo High Court Judge Kenta Hiraga, who was genuinely
infamous at the time (on the level of television and front-page national news) for
having giving guidance to a subordinate judge ("advice to a junior colleague") that
was viewed as directing a pro-government result in a hugely significant case
concerning the constitutionality of Japan's self-defense forces. See Levin, supra note
2, at 262-63 and sources cited there. Days after scandal surrounding these events
became public in October 1969, Judge Hiraga was transferred to Tokyo High Court.
Although impeachment proceedings followed with complaints against both Judge
Hiraga and the receiving Judge Shigeo Fukushima, Judge Hiraga suffered only a
formal reprimand. See NAGANUMA JIKEN HIRAGA SHOKAN: 35 NEN ME NO SHOGEN
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views in media (i.e., magazines and journals),
demonstrated a bias regarding the underlying issues that
could be reasonably anticipated to factor into his decision
making in the particular case,
2) that the plaintiffs' and their counsel's involvement with
pending impeachment proceedings against Judge A
would either generate bias against them warranting
challenge under Article [24] or serve as grounds for his
disqualification under Article [231,60
3) that Judge A demonstrated actual hostility and bias
against the petitioners when ruling on their request for his
recusal, and
4) that the various grounds raised in the complaint should
be synthesized into a compound rationale (in essence, an
argument of the whole being greater than the sum of its
parts).61
Held: Rejected in Tokyo High Court on all grounds.62 Appeal
to Japan's Supreme Court dismissed.63
Rationale: Although the Supreme Court's dismissal was not
particularly explanatory, the Tokyo High Court's ruling in the case
provides the most extensive discussion that can be found
[THE NAGANUMA CASE AND THE HIRAGA MEMO: THIRTY FIVE YEARS' OF BEARING
WITNEss] (Fukushima Shigeo et al. eds., Nihon Hyoronsha 2009) at 5 (timeline) and
346 (impeachment committee findings). Looking from today's perspective, it seems
rather remarkable that Judge Hiraga was so quickly assigned to yet another
significant social justice dispute in the courts.
60. John Haley advises that impeachment complaints are not particularly
uncommon in Japan. Haley, supra note 44, at 113 (number of petitions is
"surprisingly high.") Most, however, are brought by dissatisfied litigants, and
"rarely if ever is the personal integrity of the judge challenged." Through the time
of Haley's writing, only four judges in postwar Japan had been impeached and
ultimately removed from office. Id.
61. Toky6 K6ta Saibansho [T6ky6 High Ct.] May 8, 1970, Sh6 45 (u) no. 283, 590
HANJI 18.
62. Id.
63. Saik6 Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Sept. 29, 1970, She 45 (ku) no. 191, 100 MINSHO
499. The Supreme Court's opinion first rejected the Article 32 constitutional claims,
finding that Article 32 goes no further than guaranteeing the right to a trial in a
court of law. The analysis bifurcated the remaining arguments. As to two which
appeared to be constitutional, the Court held that their "quality in fact is nothing
more than a claim that there was a simple violation of the laws and regulations, and
therefore, meritless." As to the one remaining claim: "It is difficult to gather the
gist of the points there, but . .. none can escape being rejected."
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elaborating on Articles [23] and [24].64
Ultimately denying the petition, the court's explanation
included the following insights:
[T]he grounds for challenge in CCP Article [24] ... means
situations where between the judge and the concrete facts [of the
case], there are specific personal or material connections which,
objectively regarded, would bar an expectation of a fair trial
The judicial challenge system is intended to add flexibility
( t 6 L 4 6 t: 4) as a supplement to [Article 23's]
judicial disqualification provisions. The system has the same
purpose as the judicial disqualification system, which is to ensure
fairness in the exercise of judicial power and preserve the people's
trust in the courts (M J® OAEI&Jl f Qi{o
Consequently, as to the grounds for judicial challenge, the
provision is not standardized as are the grounds for judicial
qualification; instead [determining] circumstances that would
prejudice impartiality is said to be entrusted to the judgment of
the courts (MJEO JJiC attk'.). Article [24]'s bounds
cover the gap between the provisions for disqualification as
provided for in Code of Civil Procedure Article [23] and what is
called for by the purpose of the system as described above.65
Following this general explication, the Court's ruling used
strikingly dismissive language with regards to the various grounds
raised by the petition.66
64. T6kyo Kata Saibansho [Thky6 High Ct.] May 8, 1970, She 45 (u) no. 283, 590
HANJI 18.
65. Id. (emphasis added, paragraph breaks also added for English language
reading clarity).
66. The politically charged environment of Japan's legal system, particularly at
the time of the earlier cases, would surely have been a factor in drawing out the
language used in cases at least through the 1970s. As Professor Yasuhei Taniguchi
has explained, a strong current of mistrust separated the bench and bar in the early
postwar years. In contrast to the post-war unified track for legal education of
judges and lawyers, the earlier generation of pre-war judges and lawyers launched
their careers from separate institutional paths. This social gap was exasperated
owing to a significant cohort of lawyers being openly associated with communist
and socialist political movements, and movement causes underlying many social
justice cases. Though legacy traces of this history may remain, the bold force of the
polarized dynamics has clearly dissipated. Levin, supra note 2, at 316-17 (citing
Yasuhei Taniguchi, The Changing Image of Japanese Practicing Lawyers, in EMERGING
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Where points I and II raised complaints that Judge A had
demonstrated bias through prior public remarks, the Court held:
As to Judge A's words and actions that have been indicated [as
problematic] by the petitioners, these were nothing more than
personal expressions in magazines and journals of the judge's
impressions generally about the law (V,±- 3 i' L
R ~f@ & Ut ?i A 9 4 N t 0) with no connection to the instant
litigation. Therefore, they cannot serve as the factual grounds for
a judicial challenge. 67
Point III raised complaints that Judge A should be subject to
challenge under Article [24] or be disqualified under Article [23]
with regards to a pending Judicial Impeachment Complaint that the
petitioners and their counsel had participated in filing for.
As to the Article [24] claim:
It is clear that this rationale in and of itself involves no specific
personal connection between the judge and the instant case. In
this manner, with no specific connection linking to the actual case,
it being merely a complaint for impeachment by the parties and
legal counsel in this case against same judge as in this case, it
should be said that this does not give rise to circumstances with
regards to the judge which, objectively regarded, would directly68
interfere in the fairness of the trial. The current situation derives
from the petitioners' and their counsel's risk burden in having
filed the impeachment complaint, brought on by their own
decision; they in essence consented to the facts which have led to
their worrying about disadvantageous trial proceedings owing to
the judge's animosity. Accordingly, this cannot be recognized as
grounds for judicial challenge regardless of how great their sense
of insecurity. 69
And as to the Article [23] claim:
[I]t is clear beyond even the need for explanation
(MifT 6 C4 < 6 /P C 70 , ronzuru made mo naku akiraka de
aru) that an impeachment petition against the presiding judge
CONCEPTS OF RIGHTS IN JAPANESE LAW 223, 228-30 (Harry N. Scheiber & Laurent
Mayali eds. 2007).
67. T6kyo Kato Saibansho [T6ky6 High Ct.] May 8, 1970, She 45 (u) no. 283, 590
HANJI 18 (emphasis added).
68. Perhaps intentionally drawing upon the prior precedent holding, the
Japanese phrasing here, l i / tadachi ni, is the same as in the Supreme Court's
1955 ruling in the son-in-law case, discussed supra.
69. T6ky6 K6t6 Saibansho [T6ky6 High Ct.] May 8, 1970, Sh6 45 (u) no. 283, 590
HANJI 18 (emphasis added).
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brought by a party or their counsel as in this case does not give
rise to grounds for disqualification pursuant to Code Of Civil
Procedure Article [23].70
Point IV raised complaints that Judge A should be subject to
challenge under Article [24] having demonstrated actual hostility
and bias against the petitioners when ruling from the bench on their
request for his recusal.71
[Wie cannot conceivably recognize (YIJ)iA % Y56WW,, tdtei
mitomerarenai) that it represents the risk of an unfair trial or that
Judge A had hostility or prejudice against the petitioners just
because, as the presiding judge, he did not accept the petitioners'
request as to the court's prior configuration and his recusal. 72
5. Art. [241: Shakumeiken73 guidance to counselfor one party to
detriment of opposing party did not demonstrate bias or
unfairness to the opposing party.
Tokyo High Court, 1971.74
Facts: After two trial court judges gave allegedly advantageous
guidance to counsel representing the Governor of Tokyo as to
additional legal claims available under the factual evidence that had
been already proffered, the opposing party objected that the
circumstances demonstrated prejudice implicating the judges'
impartiality in the proceedings.
Held: Appeal to Tokyo High Court dismissed.
Rationale: The judges' guidance to one party was fitting to the
70. Id. (emphasis added).
71. Id. (emphasis added).
72. Id. The idea that the various points could be synthesized into some larger
more significant rationale was also rejected outright.
73. Shakumeiken guidance, M11, represents the practice of Japan's judges to
provide guidance to one party in a civil matter as might advance that party's
presentation of the facts or law in the case. YOHIKAKU SHIN HORITSU GAKU JITEN
[YOHIKAKU'S NEw LEGAL DIcTIONARY] 658-59 (3d ed. 1989). This is formally
expressed in the Code, via the judge's explicit authority to ask for explanations, at
MINSOHO (C. Civ. PRo.) art. 149. However, given Japan's limited number of lawyers
and high percentage of pro se litigation, shakumeiken is viewed as means for leveling
the playing field in litigation between a represented and unrepresented party. It is
also seen as a means of promoting judicial efficiency as it gives the court the means
to streamline and direct litigation to the most meaningful factual or legal issues.
74. TokyO K6to Saibansho [Tokyo High Ct.] Apr. 3, 1971, Sh6 46 (gyo-ta) no. 1,
263 HANTA 226.
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judicial role and did not demonstrate a bias or unfairness to the
opposing party.
There is no room for doubt that it is within the proper range of
shakumeiken authority for courts to suggest alternative legal claims
to a party in circumstances where a different legal claim can be
contemplated from the documentary evidence, etc. that has been
already produced [in the case]. And so in this case as to Judges A
and B, it cannot be said that there were circumstances with
regards to either judge that would prejudice the impartiality of a
judicial decision. 7
6. Art. 24: Alleged bias demonstrated in prior litigation
pertaining to identical issues did not present circumstances
which would prejudice impartiality under Article 24.
Osaka District Court, 2001.76
Facts: Judge An was the presiding judge and Judge B was a
judge on the panel in a set of highly publicized workplace gender
bias suits filed in Osaka in the mid-1990s. The two judges ruled
against the plaintiffs with factual findings and legal holdings
strongly antagonistic to workplace gender bias claims. Given that
the two judges remained assigned to a pending case, Plaintiffs'
counsel petitioned under CCP Article 24 to have Judges A and B
removed from the remaining case in light of a risk of prejudice
purportedly demonstrable from their earlier rulings.
Held: Article 24 petition for judicial challenge denied.
Rationale: Fact findings are inherently case specific and legal
conclusions are handed down in the exercise of a judge's
professional responsibility. Accordingly, a judge's prior fact
findings and legal conclusions, even in similar litigation, would
ordinarily not present circumstances which would prejudice
impartiality under Article 24. The sole exception would be a history
75. Id.
76. Osaka Chiho Saibansho [Osaka Dist. Ct.] May 18, 2001, Hei 13 (mo) no.
2356, 1072 HANTA 249.
77. Professor Hiroko Hayashi, who participated in the case as an amicus curiae
in support of the plaintiffs, identifies Judge A as Tetsuo Matsumoto. Professor
Hayashi believes that Judge Matsumoto demonstrated "strong gender-bias against
women, especially women's role in the society and family life." E-mail to author
from Hiroko Hayashi, Professor of Labor Law, Fukuoka University Law School and
President-elect of Miyazaki Municipal University (Nov. 28, 2012) (on file with
author).
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revealing a severe deviation from social conventional wisdom in the
judge's views.
The judicial challenge provision of "circumstances with regards to
a judge that would prejudice impartiality" awakens when there
are concerns, which when viewed objectively, suggest a likelihood
of unfairness (T 1E5flJt6 t,65To5 ) in the trial
proceedings....
[As to judge's findings and legal determinations in prior
unrelated cases, then,] except in the rare situation where specific
circumstances reflect bias or prejudice in the involved judges such
as would give rise to a risk of unfair judgment contrary to social
conventional wisdom such as findings or judgments being
considerably slanted away from societal common sense,78 it is
understood that the rulings of the involved judges in prior
unrelated cases cannot be a reason for judicial challenge. 79
7. Art. [231424]: Presiding over a State Redress Act claim
arising from that same judge's ruling in earlier litigation
may present circumstances for judicial disqualification
under Article [23).
Kobe District Court, 1983 (judicial challenge denied);o
BUT Takamatsu High Court, 2002 (reversing district court and
recognizing grounds for disqualification).81
Kobe District Ct., 1983.
Facts: In an initial matter, Judge A had ruled against Plaintiff B
and dismissed Plaintiff B's case. Plaintiff B then brought several
collateral actions pursuant to Japan's State Redress Act 82 against the
78. In Japanese: " *4J rbit & 7) 6 WL< UL-f3
79. Osaka Chiho Saibansho [Osaka Dist. Ct.] May 18, 2001, Hei 13 (mo) no.
2356, 1072 HANTA 249 (emphasis added, paragraph breaks also added for English
language reading clarity).
80. K6be Chih6 Saibansho [KObe Dist. Ct.] Oct. 28, 1983, Sh6 58 (mo) no. 1038,
1109 HANJI 126,517 HANTA 191.
81. Takamatsu KOto Saibansho [Takamatsu High Ct.] March 7, 2002, Hei 13 (ne)
576, 49 SHOMU GEPPO No. 10 2886.
82. Kokka baish6 h6 [State Redress Act], Law No. 125 of 1947. This law,
codifying and expanding pre-war judicial precedent, is the implementing statute
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state seeking damages for the alleged wrongful public act of a state
employee (Judge A) for ruling against Plaintiff B in the first action.
Plaintiff B also brought a new case before the court pertaining to his
marriage.83 When Judge A was assigned to preside over the new
action, Plaintiff petitioned under CCP [241 to have Judge A removed
from the case in light of Judge A's being a defendant in the state
redress actions.
Held: Article [24] petition for judicial challenge denied by trial
court.
Rationale: There is qualitative difference between civil actions
where a judge is a defendant concerning his private interests and
civil actions where a judge is a defendant only as to his public acts
in carrying out judicial duties. Apart from "special
circumstances,"8 pending state redress claims do not present
circumstances which call for removing a judge in unrelated
litigation.
To begin with, we begin with a review of the meaning of the claim
in petitioner's challenge owing to "Judge A being the defendant in
separate matters brought by petitioner." According to the record
in the case, the separate matters claimed by the petitioner (Kobe
District Court Toyooka City Branch case numbers 29, 30, 32, 33, 35
seeking compensatory damages) are all complaining of
impropriety in the fact-finding and legal decision-making as
actually carried out by Judge A in case number 103, with the
claims seeking state redress against the state and Judge A based
upon these complaints.
However, in cases where there is a relationship between a party
opposing a litigant on the one hand and presiding over a case
concerning that litigant on the other hand, this would be limited
to ordinary common civil litigation matters where the parties are
divided by their private interests. In a case such as a state redress
claim as here, entirely focused upon how the judge carried out his
for Article 17 of Japan's Constitution. John 0. Haley, Japanese Administrative Law:
An Introduction, in LAW AND SOCIETY IN CONTEMPORARY JAPAN: AMERICAN
PERSPECTIVEs 39-40 (John. 0. Haley ed., Japan American Society for Legal Studies
1988); KENPO art. 17.
83. It is unclear what the initial litigation addressed, though it seems a likely
guess that Judge A's prior ruling also concerned Plaintiff B's marriage.
84. K6be Chih6 Saibansho [K6be Dist. Ct.] Oct. 28, 1983, Sh6 58 (mo) no. 1038,
1109 HANJI 126, 517 HANTA 191. The court notes this purported exception, but does
not offer any explanation of what kinds of "special circumstances" (in Japanese,
$M 'N ) would call for a different result.
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public duties, (and what's more the case decisions and the general
academic consensus rejecting a judge's personal liability for
damages pursuant to the State Redress Act), the particular quality
of that kind of action is that, except in special circumstances
(* i f $@ 4 0iR9), this alone cannot give rise to grounds for
judicial challenge. 85
Takamatsu High Court, 2002
Facts: Judge A was the presiding judge of a High Court three-
judge panel that ruled against Plaintiff B and dismissed Plaintiff
B's case. Plaintiff B then brought a collateral action pursuant to
Japan's State Redress Act 86 against the state seeking damages for the
alleged intentional wrongful public act of a state employees for the
initial ruling against Plaintiff B.87 Judge A (then a judge on the
Takamatsu District Court) was assigned to preside over the trial
against the state, arising in part on claims pertaining to his earlier
ruling in Plaintiff B's previous case.88 Judge A then ruled against
the Plaintiff and dismissed his later case. Plaintiff appealed this
further loss to the High Court.
Held: The Takamatsu High Court reversed and set aside Judge
A's decision and remanded for retrial of the collateral action
litigation before a new judge.
Rationale: Although Judge A was technically not a party in the
collateral litigation against the state, he was nonetheless an
interested party within the meaning of CCP 23(1). This was
because, if Plaintiff B prevailed in the collateral action for wrongful
action in the first matter, and it could be proven that Judge A's
action had been intentional or grossly negligent, the state would
have the right under State Redress Act Article 1(2) to seek
indemnification from him for the judgment awarded. Accordingly,
85. Id. (emphasis added).
86. Kokka baish6 h6 [State Redress Act], Law No. 125 of 1947.
87. This collateral action sought damages with regards to two prior matters.
Judge A appears to have only been involved with one of the two.
88. Judge A's career promotional track most likely took him from being
presiding judge of a single High Court panel to a senior role overseeing the entire
Takamatsu District Court, but details are not immediately available. Assuming
that he was in a senior administrative role at the District Court (and therefore
carrying a reduced case load), one can wonder if it was merely coincidental that he
was assigned to preside over Plaintiff B's later case. In particular, if in fact Judge A
went out of his way to be assigned to the case, then it would seem that Plaintiff B's
concerns of a preexisting bias might have been reasonably founded.
498 [Vol. 36:2
The Meaning of Fairness
Judge A's potential to be liable to the state made him an obligor for
redemption (4R IAt/ shkan gimusha), one of the specifically
listed situations in Article 23(1) that compels disqualification.
Having not stepped down from the case, the original trial judgment
in the collateral action was reversed pursuant to CCP Article 306 89
and the case remanded for a retrial under a new judge pursuant to
CCP Article 307.90
C. Discussion
1. Observations from Judicial Disqualification and Challenge Cases
This set of cases, representing the total body of case law
regarding the substantive standards of CCP Articles 23 and 24,91
opens a window revealing the meaning of fairness in Japanese law
through concrete decisions of Japan's judges in their own words.
A number of observations are available.
First, the courts appear willing to draw upon formalistic
determinations that inflexibly address the statutory language to the
detriment of judicial challenge claims. 92 For example, contrary to
the rulings in the first cases above, it seems at least a plausible
interpretation of Article 23 that a judge who had presided over
months or years of ongoing litigation, prepared factual dossiers, etc.,
but transferred away before the final ruling was officially handed
89. MINSOHO (C. CIV. PRO.) art. 306 ("If the procedures followed by the court of
first instance when making a judgment are in violation of any Acts, the court of
second instance shall revoke the judgment of first instance.").
90. MINSOHO (C. CIV. PRO.) art. 307 ("The court of second instance, when
revoking the judgment of first instance that has dismissed the action as unlawful
without prejudice, shall remand the case to the court of first instance; provided,
however, that this shall not apply where additional oral arguments concerning the
case are not necessary.")
91. See supra note 33 (explanation of search methodology).
92. Formalism is not a given. The courts have interpretively traveled beyond
statutory phrasing when it fit the purpose of addressing abusive or incessant
petitions for judicial challenge. For example, despite the unambiguous text of CCP
Article [25] that "a judge may not participate in making a judicial decision on the
disqualification of or a challenge to him/herself," at least two lower courts have
upheld a judge's spontaneous bench ruling denying an incessant Article [24]
petitioner's challenge without staying the proceedings for a panel of uninvolved
judges from the court to resolve the petition. Thky6 K~to Saibansho [TOky6 High
Ct.] Jan. 16, 1964, Sh6 38 (ra) no. 746, 15 KAMINSHO No.1 4, 15 TOKO JIHO MINJI No.1
1; Osaka Chih6 Saibansho [Osaka Dist. Ct.] March 12, 1966, Sh6 24 (wa) no. 510, 17
KAMINSHO No. 3.4 138, 455 HANJi 50, 191 HANTA 197.
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down, would be seen as having "participated in a prior level of the
case." Similarly, it again seems plausible that there would be a
potential for unfair bias when the presiding judge of a three-judge
appellate panel is the son-in-law of the counsel for one party in the
litigation. Nonetheless and particularly in these early cases, the case
holdings demonstrated a remarkably narrow acknowledgement of
the potential for bias warranting disqualification or upholding ajudicial challenge.
Second, the courts appear strikingly comfortable with minimal
articulations of their reasoning in rejecting petitions for
disqualification or judicial challenge.93 I have previously joked that
the 1955 son-in-law decision mimicked former U.S. First Lady
Nancy Reagan famous exhortation to "just say no." 94 Without
meaning any disrespect, this seems to be generally consistent
throughout the body of decisions reported here. All but two were
decided with the court's declarations in summary conclusions and
really only one, the Tokyo High Court decision of 1970, provided
elucidation into its interpretation of the purpose, meaning, and best
application of the statute.95
Third, several of the holdings were framed in language that was
dismissive, and in at least one case severely dismissive, of the claims
93. The 1991 judicial rulemaking case seems especially notably for deftly
avoiding any exploration of the meaning of impartiality. By simply setting thejustices' legally designated duties as being ipso jure legitimate and ipso facto superior
to Article 24's dictates, the question of whether there were circumstances that
would prejudice impartiality escaped substantive attention entirely. See supra text
accompanying notes 53-56. Moreover, the Court could have chosen an alternative
path. Although it is not historical practice, nothing in the Court Act appears to bar
a justice being substituted in from another petty bench and the Court could thus
establish rules allowing for substitution to address circumstances that would
prejudice impartiality. See Saibansho h6 [Court Act], Law No. 59 of 1947, arts. 9(Full Bench and Petty Bench) and 10 (Examination of the Full Bench and Petty
Bench).
94. Levin, supra note 2, at 304.
95. Even there, the court's conclusion took back the opening provided in the
dicta when it expressed that these matters are, in the end, simply entrusted to thejudgment of the courts. In the Osaka Gender Discrimination case, the court briefly
explained Article 24 with a seemingly broader vision (as addressing "concerns,
which when viewed objectively, suggest a likelihood of unfairness in the trial
proceedings") before closing the door with a narrow standard as to the question it
was called upon to address. Nonetheless, that decision was also at least modestly
revealing of the court's rationale. T6kyO K6t6 Saibansho [T6ky6 High Ct.] May 8,
1970, Sh6 45 (u) no. 283, 590 HANJI 18; Osaka Chih6 Saibansho [Osaka Dist. Ct.]
May 18, 2001, Hei 13 (mo) no. 2356, 1072 HANTA 249.
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raised.96 (The Tokyo High Court particularly stands out, with each
of the petitioners' various points being forcefully shut down.9 ) In
any legal system, the legal method is fundamentally an inquiry into
the evidence of the law from the texts, judicial opinions, and
scholarly commentary. Thus, any lawyer facing a question
regarding either Article 23 or 24 today would surely draw a chill
from the textures and tones of these decisions when assessing the
likelihood of success in raising a similar issue to the court.98
Moreover, the lawyer's professional responsibility demands honest
contemplation of possible judicial retribution;99 the Tokyo High
Court has given clear notice that this risk is assumed by the moving
party.100
Rights discourse is also notably absent. Despite the explicit
textual inclusion of an ostensible due process right in Japan's
Constitution, all of the cases are presented under statutory analysis
of the Code of Civil Procedure and no holdings consider the
Constitution's Article 32 in their rationale.101 International human
rights treaties, which are periodically referenced in Japan's judicial
discourse,102 are similarly unmentioned. 03
96. As noted supra note 66, the rancor was almost certainly reflecting the
politically charged environment of Japan's legal system at the time. Nonetheless,
the harsh tone against judicial challenge petitions in those earlier opinions remains
on display for lawyers and judges assessing the state of the law today.
97. See supra text accompanying notes 66-72. In the prior participation cases as
well, supra text accompanying notes 42-49, both rulings called out the arguments
raised on appeal as being nothing more than "the appellants' peculiar opinions"
98. Judges researching the issue would correspondingly see the same evidence
when assessing their choices in how to respond to requests for recusal and petitions
for disqualification or challenge.
99. Again, this is not meant to impugn Japan's judges, but to recognize honestly
the inherent foibles of the human ego. See, e.g., FLAMM, supra note 32, §1.7.
100. "They in essence consented to the facts which have led to their worrying
about disadvantageous trial proceedings owing to the judge's animosity." T6ky6
K6t6 Saibansho [T6ky6 High Ct.] May 8, 1970, Sh6 45 (u) no. 283, 590 HANJI 18.
101. Contrast FLAMM, supra note 32, §2.5 (presenting cases drawing upon
constitutional due process grounds for judicial disqualification in the U.S.). Flamm
also reports that "determinations are rarely made on due process grounds," but this
is owing to state and federal legislation providing stricter standards. Id. at 34-35.
102. See generally Yuji IWASAWA, INTERNATIONAL LAW, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND
JAPANESE LAW (1998); Kenneth L. Port, The Japanese International Law "Revolution":
International Human Rights Law and Its Impact in Japan, 28 STAN. J. INT'L L. 139 (1991).
103. Perhaps this derives from the fact that all but one of the decisions rejected
the various petitions raised and that rights discourse would be more likely to be
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Finally, in light of both the formalistic and narrow perspectives,
and the reticence to provide careful explanation, what seems most
dramatically absent is any contemplation of the appearance of bias as
a factor in the jurisprudence surrounding Articles 23 and 24. The
most significant deviations are arguably the 1970 Tokyo High Court
decision and the 2001 Osaka Gender Discrimination Case, but the
exceptions there essentially prove the rule. The Tokyo court noted
the importance of "the people's trust in the courts", before setting an
absolutist standard that there be "concrete facts [of the case] ...
which, objectively regarded, would bar an expectation of a fair
trial." 04 The Osaka court ostensibly set out a more open review for
"concerns, which when viewed objectively, suggest a likelihood of
unfairness" but shut the door with a severely narrow standard
addressing the facts in the case.105  Under either articulation
instances, the appearance of bias "in which the judge's impartiality
might reasonably be questioned" as is used in U.S. federal courts,
would apparently be insufficient.106
In short, these cases show a set of circumstances where Japan's
judges seem to be comfortable setting the bounds of fairness for civil
justice in Japan internally, opaquely, and drawing strictly upon an
internalized self-regard for their professional capacities to decide
matters fairly. This is, as Professor Daniel Foote has already aptly
observed, a declaration to the public to "Trust Us."107
presented in a decision granting a petition. Rights discourse, though absent here, is
anything but foreign in the Japanese legal socio-legal setting. See, e.g., ERIC A.
FELDMAN, THE RITUAL OF RIGHTS IN JAPAN: LAW, SOCIETY, AND HEALTH POLICY (2000),
and EMERGING CONCEPTS OF RIGHTS IN JAPANESE LAW (Harry N. Scheiber & Laurent
Mayali eds. 2007)
104. Toky6 K6t6 Saibansho [T6ky6 High Ct.] May 8, 1970, Sh6 45 (u) no. 283, 590
HANJI 18 (emphasis added).
105. Osaka Chih6 Saibansho [Osaka Dist. Ct.] May 18, 2001, Hei 13 (mo) no. 2356,
1072 HANTA 249.
106. U.S. Code of Judicial Conduct, Canon 3. Alfini et al. provide a clear
explanation: "This standard for disqualification when objective appearance casts
reasonable doubt upon impartiality even though the judge in question subjectively
feels that he or she can act fairly and evenhandedly." ALFINI ET AL., supra note 34, 4-
11 (citations omitted); see generally Cynthia Gray, Avoiding the Appearance of
Impropriety: With Great Power Comes Great Responsibility, 28 U. ARK. LITrLE ROCK L.
REV. 63 (2005); FLAMM, supra note 32, ch. 5; ALFINI ET AL., supra note 34, §4.04;
GARWIN ET AL., supra note 34, 58-69.
107. Daniel H. Foote, Recent Reforms to the Japanese Judiciary: Real Change or Mere
Appearance?, 66 HO-SHAKAIGAKU [SOCIOLOGY L.] 128, 151 (2007). The Tokyo High
Court literally expressed this when explaining that the bounds of Article 24 are
"entrusted to the judgment of the courts." See supra text accompanying notes 57-65.
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2. Analytical Limitations and Some More Tentative Hypotheses
Before moving on, it is important to acknowledge what we do
not know, i.e, what is not presented in the data from this body of
published judicial decisions.
Most importantly, we do not know whether the paucity of
published cases represents a positive or negative reality of how
unreported cases have been decided. Put another way, we do not
know whether trust in the courts to determine fairness bestowed by
Articles 23 and 24 is warranted.108
One plausible hypothesis is that the scarcity of published
decisions reflects commendable self-policing. In this line of
reasoning, we can believe that Japanese judges sagely recuse
themselves or are otherwise relieved of their duties when
"circumstances that would prejudice impartiality" arise.109 Hence,
there are few reported decisions because there has been little need
for appeals. If we could view the system from an omniscient
platform, we would conclude that the system admirably provides
fair arbiters to litigants in Japanese courts, or at least as fair as might
be reasonably hoped for from a humanly operated social system.
Alternatively, one could believe that that the scarcity of
reported decisions can be attributed to a scarcity of petitions, which
derives from a perception of futility on the part of litigants and/or
their legal counsel in seeking a disqualification or challenge.
Petitions for judicial challenge carry an inevitable risk that a
challenged judge will not only remain in the case after the petition is
108. The Tokyo High Court's explanation that these questions have been
entrusted to the courts by the Code's provisions may be valid on its face, but it does
not go far enough. It is a separate question, and less clear, whether the drafters of
the Code intended for Japanese courts to make their decisions so opaquely and
yielding the narrow interpretations that the courts have given.
109. It is well-acknowledged by all observers that Japan's judicial bureaucracy
exercises substantial control over the work and career paths of the nation's judges.
See, e.g., Haley, supra note 44, at 114 ("As members of a close-knit elite bureaucracy,
career judges are subject to an institutional system of formal and informal peer
control familiar only to the military in the United States.") Accordingly, I had
anticipated learning of a mechanism, such as nonpublished internal guidelines, that
would help judges in Japan address questions concerning recusal, disqualification,
and challenge. However, a recently retired judge recalls there being nothing of the
kind; when questions of this sort arose in his service, the judges looked to the Code,
cases, and applicable legal scholarship on their own accord. E-mail to author, dated
Nov. 29, 2012 (on file with author). In that case, of course, a judge would be
looking for guidance from the Code provisions and case holdings presented in this
paper.
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denied, but that the judge will then view the moving party less
favorably as a result.no Accordingly, every challenge involves a
risk-benefit calculation and such calculations will be processed
taking into account the extant jurisprudence on this issue in the
cases presented above. Under this conjecture, litigants see bleak
odds in seeking a disqualification or challenge, petitions are not
filed even when a fitting sense of justice suggests that they would be
warranted, and the system regularly fails.
The two hypotheses offer a lead for future empirical study to
assess perceptions of judges and participants, but some information
is already available. Careful research has been presented in a
survey of former participants in the justice system showing a mixed
review."n But more research, and particularly research focused on
perceptions of bias, appearances of bias, and the circumstances ofjudicial challenge petitions filed and unfiled, remains to be carried
110. Just as was alleged about Judge Hiraga, this presumes that judges will
incorporate emotional sentiments into their judicial behavior. Though the mythic
lore of civil justice might contest that assumption, I accept it as an undeniable truth
long ago established by the great legal realists and repeatedly since. See, e.g., Karl
Llewellyn, Some Realism about Realism, 44 HARV. L. REv. 1222, 1254 (1931) ("There is
fairly general agreement on the importance of personnel, and of court organization,
as essential to making laws have meaning."). For more recent work in this area,
see Chris Guthrie, Jeffery J. Rachlinski & Andrew J. Wistrich, Inside the Judicial Mind
86 CORNELL L. REV. 777, 780 (2000-01) ("Our research . . . identifies a more
fundamental source of systematic judicial error: wholly apart from political
orientation and self-interest, the very nature of human thought can induce judges to
make consistent and predictable mistakes in particular situations.")
111. A June 2000 interview survey carried out for the Japanese government's
Judicial Reform Council from a representative national sample of former civil trial
litigants determined a mean score of only 3.13 (1 = very unsatisfied, 5 = very
satisfied; SD = 1.27) and a roughly comparable inquiry in 2006 demonstrated
almost identical results with regards to their evaluation of fairness of the nation's
civil judicial system. Ken-ichi Ohbuchi et al., Procedural Justice and the Assessment of
Civil Justice in Japan, 39 LAw & Soc'Y REV. 875, 882 (2005); MINJI SOSHO SEIDO
KENKY.KAI (STUDY GROUP ON THE CIVIL JUSTICE SYSTEM), 2006 NEN MINJI SOSHO RIYOSHA
CHOSA (2006 SURVEY OF CIVIL LITIGANTS) 543 (2007) (mean score = 3.15, SD = 1.11). Of
course these results were shaped by respondents' satisfaction with the outcomes
they had received, but "the standardized total effect of perceived procedural
fairness on the evaluation of the judicial system was larger than that of favorability
of the outcome.... [W]hat the litigants obtained from the civil trials was not the
primary influence on their evaluation of the judicial system. Instead their
perception of procedural fairness of the trials was more influential in this regard."
Ohbuchi et al., supra at 887. Professor Dan Foote presents a more favorable
assessment: "Opinion polls of the Japanese public have consistently recorded
rather high levels of respect for the judiciary." Foote, supra note 107, at 151 (citing
Chuo Ch6sasha (2004)).
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out.112
For the time being, given that the two scenarios are not
mutually exclusive, my tentative impression is that both hypotheses
have ample grounding. In other words, I believe there is truth in
both lines of reasoning.
Personal conversations with judges and a handful of academics
have been reassuring and confident that the system works properly
most of the time.113 In this regard, I stand with Professor John
Haley's often-cited assessment that "Japanese judges are among the
most honest, politically independent, and professionally competent
in the world today." 114 As I have written previously, I firmly believe
that "almost all of Japan's judges, almost all the time, do their jobs
just as one would hope."115
But this high regard does not absolve the Japanese judges from
being subject to mortal fates and foibles. I am not convinced their
track record is perfect and it may not even be adequate. In this
latter regard, I have also had many conversations with lawyers and
academics who perceive a flawed system, where judges harboring
unfair biases may nonetheless preside over relevant cases. 116 There
appears to be truth in these impressions as well.117
III. Conclusion: Looking Back after Ten Years' Experience
with Japanese Justice System Reform
The establishment of the Justice System Reform Council by the
nation's Cabinet in July 1999 initiated a new era for Japan's legal
system. Headed by one of the country's most highly regarded
112. Grant funding institutions will be welcome to take notice here.
113. These conversations have been informal and off the record. Accordingly,
the information is shared without citation and not meant to represent substantive
authority on the point.
114. Haley, supra note 44, at 99. Professors Mark Ramseyer and Eric Rasmusen
similarly conclude that in "the vast majority of court cases, [which] in any modern
society are mundane in the extreme," the judiciary seems to be doing its job fairly
and appropriately. See Mark Ramseyer & Eric B. Rasmusen, The Case for Managed
Judges: Learning from Japan After the Political Upheaval of 1993, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 1879,
1928 (2006).
115. Levin, supra note 2, at 289.
116. As in note 113 supra, this shares anecdotal information and is not meant to
present an evidenced claim.
117. The apparent lack of even internal guidelines that could help Japanese
judges navigate these waters, see supra note 109, adds weight to my concerns here.
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constitutional law scholars, the Council took on major structural
reforms for the civil justice system, the criminal justice system,
responses to internationalization, coordination of comprehensive
legal support, and launched reforms concerning all elements of legal
personnel training and development from the legal education
system at the universities, up through the career tracks of legal
professionals.118 In June 2001, the Council submitted its report to
the Cabinet, 119 and the real work began with twenty-one separate
pieces of legislation enacted between January 2002 and December
2004 implementing pieces of the system reform proposals.120
Although significant components of the justice system remained
untouched and critical scholars in Japan have suggested that
elements of change may have been nothing more than "form over
substance" 121 or "a rapid lapse from idealism to instrumentalism,"122
the Reform Council plainly launched a set of significant changes to
the legal system on a scale rivaled only by the Meiji and Occupation
era reforms in recent Japanese history.123
118. PROMOTION OFFICE OF JUSTICE SYSTEM REFORM, CABINET SECRETARIAT, AND
MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, JUSTICE SYSTEM REFORM OF JAPAN: FOR A FASTER, FRIENDLIER, AND
MORE RELIABLE JUSTICE SYSTEM (undated government-published promotional
pamphlet, copy on file with author) [hereinafter JSRC Pamphlet]. See generally
Setsuo Miyazawa, The Politics of Judicial Reform in Japan: The Rule of Law at Last?,
ASIAN-PAC. L. & POL'Y J. (Special Issue) 89, 112 (2001)); Setsuo Miyazawa, Law
Reform, Lawyers, and Access to Justice, in JAPANESE BUSINESS LAw, 39 (Gerald P.
McAlinn ed., 2007). See also Setsuo Miyazawa's introductory remarks in this
symposium issue: Successes, Failures, and Remaining Issues of the Justice System
Reform in Japan: An Introduction to the Symposium Issue, 36 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L.
REV. 313 (2013).
119. JSRC Report, supra note 6.
120. JSRC Pamphlet, supra note 118, back cover.
121. Takayuki Ii, Japan's Judicial System May Change, But Its Fundamental Nature
Stays Virtually the Same? Recent Japanese Reforms on the Judicial Appointment and
Evaluation, 36 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 459 (2013).
122. Ichiro Ozaki, Judicial System Reform and Legalization: A Rapid Lapse from
Idealism to Instrumentalism, in EMERGING CONCEPTS OF RIGHTS IN JAPANESE LAw 211
(Harry N. Scheiber and Laurent Mayali eds., 2007). Other skeptical assessments
include Foote, supra note 107 and Koichiro Fujikura, Reform of Legal Education in
Japan: The Creation of Law Schools without a Professional Sense of Mission, 75 TULANE L.
REV. 941 (2001). this list could go on much further.
123. The subject is vast as well. Working from a list started by Professor Setsuo
Miyazawa, William S. Richardson School of Law third-year law student Adam
Mackie and I have assembled a bibliography of over 150 English-language doctrinal
and socio-legal law journal articles and book chapters published in the past ten
years that investigate changes brought about by the Council's report. Mark A.
Levin and Adam Mackie, Truth or Consequences of the Justice System Reform Council:
An English Language Bibliography from Japan's Millennial Legal Reforms, 14 ASIAN-PAC.
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Thus, it was entirely appropriate that the University of
California, Hastings College of Law convened this symposium
coinciding with the Tenth Anniversary of the Justice System Reform
Council's report in June 2001 and more closely, the Cabinet's
approval of the Plan for Promotion of Justice System Reform in
March 2002, titled "Successes, Failures, and Remaining Issues of the
Justice System Reform in Japan." This author was tasked with
assessing the successes, failures, and remaining issues with regards
to civil justice and alternative dispute resolution. However, given
the scope of just that one component of the justice system reform
initiatives,124 I chose to look through the lens of procedural justice
jurisprudence in Japan to assess the image projected there.
While the picture is unclear, the evidence seems to warrant
modest optimism.
On a minor note, the Takamatsu High Court decision of 2002
presents the first instance, groundbreaking in the Japanese context,
of an appellate court reversing a trial court owing to a flawed
determination to reject a petition for judicial disqualification or
challenge.125 Given the pervasive and percussive sound of the call
for justice system reform in the national public discourse of the time,
there can be little doubt that the judges of the Takamatsu High
Court would have perceived a changed environment wherein the
courts could and should offer more transparent sensitivity to
perceptions of the fairness of the judicial process. While Japan's
jurisprudence with regards to Articles 23 and 24 remains severely
constrained, the Takamatsu High Court's decision at least raised the
count from zero to one and thus opened up new possibilities for
litigants confronting circumstances of a potentially biased judge.126
L. & POL'Y J. (forthcoming April 2013).
124. Civil justice and ADR engage nine subtopics in the JSRC Report:
"improvement and acceleration of civil procedures, comprehensive and intensified
efforts in cases involving intellectual property rights, comprehensive and
intensified efforts in cases involving labor relations, reinforcement of the functions
of the family courts, reinforcement of the functions of the summary courts, secured
execution of rights, expansion of access to the courts, improvement of alternative
dispute resolution (ADR) mechanisms, and reform of the administrative litigation
system." JSRC Pamphlet, supra note 118, 3-6.
125. Takamatsu Kat6 Saibansho [Takamatsu High Ct.] March 7, 2002, Hei 13 (ne)
576, 49 SHOMU GEPPO No. 10 2886.
126. Just as the number one is sometimes described as infinitely larger than zero
in mathematics, the Takamatsu High Court decision surely represents a significant
step forward.
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Another decision, handed down by Japan's Supreme Court in
April 2011 almost precisely coinciding with the tenth anniversary of
the JSRC Report, appears to be demonstrating the Court's stronger
consciousness towards fundamentality of procedural fairness in
civil litigation in Japan, or at least opening a new debate on this
subject. In this concluding section, I wish to briefly introduce that
case, its jurisprudential foundation, and its merits in serving as a
beacon for hope.127
A. The Supreme Court of Japan, 2nd Petty Bench decision of April
13, 2011 and the Requirements of (Civil) Procedural Justice
On April 13, 2001, the 2nd Petty Bench of Japan's Supreme Court
reversed a Tokyo High Court decision owing to a failure of
procedural fairness in the High Court's handling of pretrial
discovery in the case.128 The lawsuit sought unpaid overtime wages.
After filing suit on the claim, plaintiff sought an order for the
production of documents including the plaintiff's workplace
timecard that would evidence the hours he or she had worked.
Defendant objected to the plaintiffs motion on the ground that it no
longer had the timecard in its possession and thus, a discovery
order should not be issued. The District Court found for the
plaintiff that the timecard existed in the defendant's possession and
ordered its production. Defendant then sought an immediate
interlocutory appeal at the Tokyo High Court, seeking to reverse the
District Court's factual finding that it possessed the timecard.
However, the plaintiff had no notice of the appeal. Neither
defendant nor the Tokyo High Court notified the plaintiff or copied
the brief to him or her as required by law and it appears the plaintiff
in fact had no notice of the appeal otherwise. Thus, with only the
defendant's filing in its purview presenting a prima facie case in
support of the-motion, the High Court found for the defendant that
the timecard did not exist in its possession and accordingly ordered
127. The 3rd Petty Bench's rulings of May 8, 2008, pertaining to Article 32 might
also be viewed as opening a jurisprudential discussion on constitutional due
process. Though the majority decision offered nothing new, at least Justice
Tahara's concurrence and Justice Nasu's dissent engaged somewhat on the
meaning of the provision. See supra note 23.
128. Saik6 Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Apr. 13, 2011, Hei 22 (ku) no. 1088, 65 MINSwo
No. 3, 1530 SAIBANSHO JIHO 1, 2119 HANTA 32, 1353 HANTA 155, 1945 KIN'YO HOMU
107. A translation is available at http://www.courts.go.jp/english/judgments/
text/2011.04.13-2010.-Ku-.No.1088.html.
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dismissal of the plaintiff's motion for production of evidence. 129
Plaintiff sought an immediate appeal to the Supreme Court
claiming that the High Court ruling, handed down without any
notice or opportunity to respond, violated its constitutional rights
under Article 32 and was illegal in variance from the Code of Civil
Procedure. The Supreme Court's 1st Petty Bench unanimously
approved the appeal, reversed the High Court decision, and
remanded for further proceedings in accordance with its ruling.130
Though the appellant had raised constitutional claims, the
ruling was framed strictly on statutory grounds.131 In relatively
straightforward reasoning, the Court recognized that the High
Court's fact-finding with regards to the existence of the timecard
would be essentially determinative of the plaintiffs motion for
production of evidence, and the failure to obtain that evidence
would be essentially determinative of the ultimate result in the
case.132 Moreover, the fact-finding of the High Court would be
shaped by the plaintiffs "opportunity to advance his/her
allegations and evidence," and it was precisely that opportunity that
was absent owing to the lack of any notice of the appeal.133
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Avoiding constitutional grounds was jurisprudentially conservative, but
entirely consistent with Japan's Supreme Court's doctrine more generally. See supra
text accompanying note 101; see generally Symposium, Decision Making on the Japanese
Supreme Court, 88 WASH. U. L. REV. 1365 (2011). The approach was quite
understandable in light of the fact that statutory grounds offered ample rationale
for the holding. Moreover, in a published commentary on the case, Professor Uno
has suggested that while a constitutional framing would have been theoretically
possible, it was not used here owing to the interlocutory procedural setting of the
appeal. Constitutional claims would ordinarily be addressed in remedying a final
judgment. Matoshi Uno, Kakokujy5 no utsushi no fusfu t0 to kakokushin ni okeru
tetsuzuki hosh5 (Failure to deliver notice of appeal and procedural protections for appeal
proceedings), 1440 JURIST (2011) 131, 132 point 3.
132. "Whether or not the Petition is granted is likely to have a material influence
on the policies of the parties to the suit on the merits in making their allegations
and proof, as well as the determination to be made by the court.... Whether or not
the appellee is found to be in possession of the Document is significant to the extent
that it nearly decides the determination of the court on whether or not to order the
submission of the Document, and the finding of the existence or nonexistence of
such fact of possession largely depends on the allegations made and evidence
produced by the parties." Saik6 Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Apr. 13, 2011, Hei 22 (ku) no.
1088, 65 MINSHO No. 3, 1530 SAIBANSHO JIHO 1, 2119 HANTA 32, 1353 HANTA 155,
1945 KIN'YO HOMU 107.
133. Id.
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Ultimately, the absence of notice was recognized to be "clearly
contrary to the requirements of procedural justice in civil procedure
and thus illegal. 34 Code of Civil Procedure (CCP) Article 2,135 noted
in the Court's list of references,136 can be plainly understood as the
legal source of the identified "requirements." Thus as noted
above,137 this case represents the inaugural sailing of CCP Article 2
in Japanese Supreme Court jurisprudence in the context of rectifying
what would seem to be a fundamental procedural failure with
regards to notice and opportunity to be heard in civil litigation.138
B. Civil Procedural Justice Cases in Japan's Supreme Court
Jurisprudence: Looking Behind and Ahead
Interestingly, the Court's phrasing in the April 2011 decision
comes out of a traceable jurisprudential history and it appears to be
launching a new conversation as well.
Looking backwards, the term "procedural justice"139 appears in
just three decisions of Japan's Supreme Court.140 It can first be seen
134. Because only the Japanese language version carries jurisprudential weight, I
am once again taking liberties to give my English language translation rather than
the Court's, which I believe is flawed and bound to mislead readers who cannot
follow the original. I have made "requirements" plural because Japanese nouns
ordinarily do not indicate singular or plural, and my choice is simply for
readability. More important is my disagreement with the choice of phrasing for
* METE / tetsuzuki seigi, presented here as "procedural justice" rather than the
Court's choice of "due process." Readers from the American legal tradition might
otherwise misunderstand the term as incorporating the richer connotations of
constitutional due process that we are accustomed to. This choice is further
supported by the fact that, in other contexts, Japanese legal parlance precisely
references due process with phrases such as iilEQ7 ME/ tekisei na tetsuzuki
andin: * 7QOt 7 / 'de-yu pu-ro-se-su'. See, e.g. EI-BEI HO JITEN (ANGLo-AMERICAN
LAw DICrIONARY) (Tanaka Hideo ed. 1998) 281 (due process of law) and 669
(procedural due process). For Japanese readers, the phrasing tetsuzuki seigi is a
Japanese word with inherently domestic connotations and meanings. Accordingly,
I use "procedural justice," which directly translates the Chinese characters in the
phrase.
135. MINSOHO (C. Civ. PRO.), art. 2.
136. The Court's sources of law were generally indicated in a preliminary list of
references and there were no specific citations in the decision text.
137. See supra text accompanying notes 25-28.
138. Perhaps champagne should be poured to celebrate.
139. See supra note 134 for an explanation of the word choice in translation here.
140. Research was carried out using the Dai-ichi Hoki H6 J6ho Sage database
service by searching for Supreme Court civil cases listing tetsuzuki seigi in three
Japanese spelling variations: JVMbEE A, TRTHE, andf- JiEM. A handful of
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in a 1964 decision where the Court incorporated the term in the
context of describing the importance of fair administrative (i.e., non-
judicial) proceedings.141
The Court's second use of the phrase "procedural justice" in a
decision handed down September 24, 1981,142 is far more interesting
because the Supreme Court's decision of April 13, 2011, lifted, albeit
without citation, extended phrasing verbatim from this 1981 ruling.
In that 1981 case, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded a
decision of the Tokyo High Court, denying a request to reopen
proceedings based on a crucial fact being withheld from the losing
party during the pendency of the action.143 The Supreme Court
found the High Court's refusal to reopen proceedings in light of the
changed circumstances that had been unknown to the appellant
through no fault of his own to be "clearly contrary to the
requirements of procedural justice in civil procedure
and thus illegal.144 Thus, though its progeny is limited, this case
cases where the phrasing appeared only in the arguments of counsel (i.e., not in the
decision text) were excluded.
141. Saik6 Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Oct. 13, 1964, Sh6 39 (gyo-tsu) no. 28, 18 MINSH0
No. 8 1619, 394 HANJi 64, 169 HANTA 131. The action, to avoid an administrative
ruling by the National Personnel Agency, was coincidentally the same case
introduced earlier in this article with regards to disqualification pursuant to having
"participated in the prior level of the case." See supra text accompanying notes 43 to
49. However, given that Court's discussion of procedural justice appears in the
context of discussion regarding administrative proceedings, and not the judicial
process, its use is not especially relevant for our study here.
142. Saik6 Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Sept. 24, 1981, Sh6 55 (o) no. 266, 35 MINSHO No. 6
1088, 823 SAIBANSHO JIHO 2, 1019 HANJI 68, 453 HANTA 66, 683 KINYO HANREI 48, 979
KIN'YO HOMU 45.
143. The facts of the case are long and convoluted. Distilled down to a core, the
case concerned purportedly fraudulent real estate transactions in the name of an
elderly person (D), carried out by his adopted son and another agent. Ultimately
the lawsuit became a contest between D's claim to having been innocently
defrauded and the ultimate buyer's claim to owning the property in good faith
reliance on the apparent agency of the adopted son and the agent. Unbeknownst to
the ultimate buyer and the court, which handed down a final judgment in D's
favor, D died in the interim between the close of proceedings at High Court and the
final ruling, leaving the adopted son and agent as his successor in the litigation.
The ultimate buyer petitioned the High Court to re-open proceedings in light of the
fact that the alleged wrongdoers had stepped into the shoes of the allegedly
innocent D. When this request was denied by the High Court, title to the property
was transferred from the ultimate buyer to D's adopted son and the agent. Id.
144. The Court cited earlier precedents indicating that the reopening of
proceedings is ordinarily within a lower court's discretion and not a matter of right
that can be claimed by a party, and concluded that the bounds of discretion had
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must be seen as the originating source for procedural justice
jurisprudence in Japan.
Only one other Supreme Court decision using the phrase
"procedural justice" can be found prior to April 2011. On July 14,
1995, the Supreme Court's 2nd Petty Bench reversed a decision
originating in the Fukushima Family Court Koriyama Branch in
which a biological father had been effectively barred from
participating in pending adoption proceedings brought by the
biological mother and a third party. 45 The Family Court judge had
in fact known of the biological father's pending nonjudicial
proceedings aiming to acknowledge paternity of the child, but chose
to disregard those proceedings in order to finalize the mother and
third-party's adoption petition. When the biological father sought
to appeal the adoption ruling, the Sendai High Court barred him
from participating owing to his having lost legal standing to sue
through the finality of the adoption. The Supreme Court,
recognizing a "considerable injustice in terms of process
(I L <U -T MIL E illia t Gt)"146 reversed the Sendai High
Court decision because "due process," 147 i.e., an opportunity to be
heard, was lacking.148
This brief history brings us to April 13, 2011, and the above-
discussed ruling referencing CCP Article 2. Just two months later,
the phrase "procedural justice" found its way again into the
Supreme Court jurisprudence, but in a dissenting voice that seemed
been exceeded in this case, but otherwise gives no explanation as to the legal
foundation for the illegality. Id.
145. Saik6 Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] July 14, 1995, Hei 6 (0) no. 425, 49 MINSHO No. 7
2674, 47 KASAI GEPPO NO.10 50, 1151 SAIBANSHO JIHO 1, 1541 HANJI 96, 887 HANTA
170. A translation is available at http://www.courts.go.jp/english/judgments/
text/1995.07.14-1994.-O-.No..425.html.
146. Here the Court integrated the notion of (in)justice into its English-language
translation of procedural justice. Omitting my edit, the Court's translation is "we
must say that it would bring about a considerable injustice in terms of due
process." Id.
147. Due process explicitly appears in the Japanese phrasing here:
AE S -ARL & / tekisei na tetsuzuki. Thus, the Court's translation accurately reflects
the original Japanese.
148. "We have no choice but to say that the Adjudication was made without
following due process which took into consideration the aforementioned
circumstances, while providing the person who should be the party to the case with
the opportunity to participate in the adjudication proceedings.
;t5LL S< 1f )L NbZ; _ 44 Z t'b;." Id.
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both a response to the April 2011 decision and antagonistic to
procedural justice's newly elevated status.149
That case was also an administrative procedure case. In a
dissent, Justice Nasu's first comment on procedural justice objected
to the majority's conclusion that the administrative decision
revoking an architect's license needed to be in writing: "procedural
justice is not something that cannot be achieved in any case unless it
is evidenced in writing."150 However Justice Nasu, opposed to the
majority's decision to remand the case for further proceedings, went
on to argue against procedural justice's import when set against
competing values such as judicial economy and efficiency.151
It seems an exciting jurisprudential conversation has begun.152
C. Ten Years After: Assessing Japan's Justice System Reform from
the Vantage Point of Fairness and Procedural Justice
Jurisprudence
Without a doubt, the concept of justice was a central core of the
Judicial System Reform Council's efforts:
Justice is expected to correct illegal actions and to provide a
remedy for injured persons' rights in concrete cases and contests
by properly resolving the cases and contests in question through
proper interpretation and application of law; to play a role in
coping with violations of rules appropriately by properly and
promptly realizing the power of punishment through fair
procedures; and thereby to maintain and to develop the law.
Accordingly, the judicial function has an aspect of realization of
public values, and the courts (the judicial branch) shall be
149. Saik6 Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] June 7, 2011, Hei 21 (gyo-hi) no. 91, 65 MINSHO
No. 4 2081, 1533 SAIBANSHO JIHO 8, 2121 HANJI 38, 1352 HANTA 123, 1937 KIN'YO
HOMU 106. (Nasu dissent). A translation is available at http://www.courts.go.jp/
english/judgments/text/2011.04.13-2010.-Ku-.No.1088.html.
150. Id. Here too, the phrasing concerned the administrative process, not
procedural justice in the courts. Thus, its use is not especially relevant for our
study.
151. "Such situation can be somewhat positively appreciated from the
perspective of pursuing procedural justice, but from the perspective of efficiency in
court proceedings, or in consideration of the time, labor, and cost to be required for
such repetition of the procedure, there is no choice, in a sense, but to make a
judgment to the contrary. In view of the above . . . [I would uphold the prior
decision and accordingly dissent.]" Id. Interestingly, Justice Nasu's judicial
conservatism here seems to be opposite to his more liberal dissenting position in
the family court proceeding case in 2008, supra note 24.
152. For the record, my inclinations go with the proceduralists.
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positioned as a pillar supporting "the space of the public good"
(A~'[ o@P4 / kokyosei no kilkan) in parallel with the Diet and
the Cabinet (the political branches), which seek to create order by
mapping out policies against the backdrop of majority rule and by
fixing and conclusively executing norms in the form of law for the
future.153
With ten years' hindsight in the implementation of the Report's
recommendations, there has been some success. Courts in Japan
have come to understand the slogan chanted by demonstrators at
the 1968 Democratic Party convention in Chicago: "The Whole
World Is Watching." Of course it is overblown to imagine that the
whole world has focused its attention on judicial proceedings in
Japan, but it does seem fair to believe that the Japanese public now
watches more actively and critically. Moreover, they are watching
from a new vantage point made possible by increased public
participation in the justice systeml 54 and a new awareness made
possible by all of the deliberations and discussions surrounding
justice system reform.
Thus, through the process of justice system reform, legal
education, lawyering, and the judicial process have all become more
of "everybody's business." Surely, all participants in the system,
including the courts, must be deeply aware of this. And I am
confident both that this exposure has been reflected in the positive
developments already seen and that there will be more good things
to come.
I used to view Japan's justice system as somewhat like a
porcelain statue, frozen in time. But its substance has softened and
there is now room for assessment, change, and most importantly,
ongoing reevaluation. 155 Japan's judges, while still mainly operating
nameless and faceless under the "Trust Us" mantra,156 have begun
153. JSRC Report, supra note 6, Part 2, Section 1.
154. See Hiroshi Fukurai, A Step in the Right Direction for Japan's Judicial Reform:
Impact of the Justice System Reform Council Recommendations on Criminal Justice and
Citizen Participation in Criminal, Civil and Administrative Litigation, 36 HASTINGS INT'L
& COMP. L. REv. 517 (2013); but see Matthew J. Wilson, Japan's New Criminal Jury Trial
System: In Need of More Transparency, More Access, and More Time, 33 FORDHAM INT'L
L.J. 487, 516-21 (2009-10) (identifying aspects the enacted lay judge system that
function as impediments to transparency for public oversight).
155. This was also the point behind my 2001 article on the reform of legal
education in Japan, urging ongoing evaluation and reform. Mark A. Levin, The
American Kaizen of Law Teaching, 2 AsIAN-PAC. L. & POL'Y J. 6 (2001).
156. Nameless and faceless are adjectives Professor Daniel Foote used to title his
514 [Vol. 36:2
The Meaning of Fairness
to understand that the Japanese public will be watching what they
do. Accordingly, there may be a stronger aim towards legitimacy
and fairness in the judicial system. 57 Procedural justice appears to
be entering the Japanese jurisprudential lexicon with both
proponents and detractors. But at least people are talking about it.
And so I will hold on to a degree of optimism for the future, noting
that optimism demands that the system retains fluidity,
introspection, and openness to change.
Whether that will happen is the real question.
book on Japan's judiciary. DANIEL H. FOOTE, NA Mo NAI KAo Mo NAI SHIHO: NIHON
No SAIBAN WA KAWARU No KA [NAMELESS FACELESS JUSTICE: WILL JAPAN'S COURTS
CHANGE?] (Tamaruya Masayuki trans. 2007); see also Foote, supra note 107 (re.
"Trust Us").
157. Another outside observer of Japanese law, Professor Craig Martin, has
called for an investigation of legitimacy in the context of Japanese constitutionalism
and richly explored what that should mean. "The key distinction is that the inquiry
into legitimacy focuses on the nature of the decision-making process, assessing the
analytical approach employed by the Court against a set of criteria that flow from
well-established theoretical approaches to constitutional interpretation, rights, and
judicial review." Even outside the constitutional arena, Martin's work offers us all
new tools to work from. Craig Martin, The Japanese Constitution as Law and the
Legitimacy of the Supreme Court's Constitutional Decisions: A Response to Matsui, 88
WASH. U. L. REv. 1527, 1535 (2011).
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